As the United Kingdom and the European Union (EU) finally conclude a trade deal after three years of uncertainty, it seems fitting to reflect a little on what led us here. As a therapist examines a couple’s marriage, let us look at what prompted the UK to divorce its partner after more than 40 years together and what institutional changes are needed for the EU’s success henceforth. 

The EU’s central issue today, and what led the UK to leave, is the question of legitimacy. Out of the EU’s governing body of the European Parliament, European Council, Council of the European Union, and the European Commission—arguably the most potent European institution—citizens of the EU only directly elect the Parliament. All the other institutions are appointed by the heads of state and government of the EU’s member countries. The Parliament, the only entity elected by the people, serves as the EU’s weakest body. Meanwhile, the European Commission, appointed by the Council of the European Union, reserves the right to legislate and apply legislation; the European Council, composed of the various European heads of state and governments, frames and suggests directives; and the Council of the European Union, comprising ministers for each EU state, amend the laws. The Parliament may amend laws, but the Commission proposes them, and the Council of the European Union must approve them. The President of the Commission, currently Ursula Von der Leyen, needs the acceptance of Parliament; but the latter can only confirm or reject, with no power to propose its candidate. Ultimately, with the EU’s current institutional framework, the scope for the people’s influence on European legislation is quite weak, especially compared to government ministers and representatives of the member states. 

Hardly a surprise, then, that citizens feel the EU neglects their voice. More fundamentally, how is this institutional framework reconcilable with contemporary ideas on the conditions for political legitimacy, namely the presence of a government accountable to the people? One might object to this rather extreme statement by invoking the powers of the member states. They frame legislation, appoint the Commission and Council of the European Union, and ultimately all policy stems from their interests. And they are elected by the people—one of the EU’s essential criteria for member states is free and fair elections. So, why all the fuss? 

Conflicts between member states negate the democratic input they could provide. Larger, more powerful countries, such as Germany and France, can easily coerce smaller entities, such as Ireland and Greece, in the case of resistance in the Council. The Euro Crisis made the effects of this arrangement blatantly clear. In 2014, when Greece was struggling with overwhelming debt and with her economy in deep recession, the Troika—a coalition of the European Commission, the IMF, and European Central Bank (ECB)— continued to force a policy of austerity on the country despite the economic harm it would produce through curtailing spending. 

Worse, the Troika emphasized and made financial aid conditional on demands that would benefit powerful European states but not the country itself. For example, the Troika forced Greece to “reform” its milk packaging policy by extending the amount of time after which regulators could legally recognize a bottle as “fresh”. The “reform” did not mean to help Greece’s industry but rather to open the country to EU competitors, especially from France and Germany, whose corporations needed to ship their milk over longer distances. The same reasoning applies to the pharmaceutical “reform” the Troika insisted on, which aimed at prying open Greek markets for foreign European companies. But the legislation did not break a monopoly; instead, it favored multinational corporations such as the French Sanofi to the detriment of small, local stores. Greece became a “sacrificial lamb,” as the economist Joseph Stiglitz put it, exploited by dominant European powers to further their interests, not that of Europeans as a whole. 

 It appears the European Union’s current institutional framework favors vested interests to the detriment of democratic accountability. The Parliament, elected by European citizens, is the organization’s weakest body. Also, large member states often bully smaller ones, furthering their own ambitions, not that of the European people. Finally, the ambiguous definition of EU sovereignty empowers separationist movements, such as Brexit. Reform, aimed at securing political and legal legitimacy, is therefore crucial. There are two different paths the EU could take in this regard. The first is to establish a federation—a “United States of Europe.” Just as individual states such as California and Texas acknowledge the ultimate sovereignty of the US federal government, so would member countries of the EU. The government of the union would rest on elections by citizens of all member states, and the territory would be governed as a whole, ensuring greater democratic control. 

But establishing a federation requires deeper political integration of the EU’s various member states and acknowledging the supremacy of Brussels’s sovereignty—a task easier said than done when considering a bloc of nations with different languages, customs, and ideals. Member states would need a constitution to define their rights, but the last time one was proposed, voters rejected it in referendums in France and the Netherlands. Furthermore, the EU would need to reform its institutions to grant more accountability to the people since only the Parliament directly represents the interests of all European citizens. Would such widespread reform and change occur in a Union that just lost one of its most important states, the UK, and suffers from a lack of coherent policy goals?

Probably not—at least not for a long time. Any plans of uniting a continent divided for centuries by territory, religion, values, and language seem politically infeasible. To be sure, the EU does provide benefits to member countries. The idea of tying together countries that have often been at war through united economic benefits is undoubtedly appealing. The customs union, Schengen, and the common market were brilliant ideas of industrial policy. The EU’s political mandate—preserving democracy and the rule of law in Europe—deserves praise, though so far, countries such as Hungary and Poland have escaped any ramifications for widespread interference in their judiciaries. And a rising China and increasingly isolationist America, despite Mr. Biden’s victory over Trump, should surely prompt European countries to forge closer military and economic ties to maintain their political independence; a lone wolf, like Britain, will face a hard task ahead. 

The EU should remain but under a different organization. A better solution to a federation would be the establishment of a confederation of states. The current European Union is a mix of a federation and confederation, with the EU exercising its sovereignty over certain legislation and maintaining a strong grip over monetary policy, fiscal policy, and international representation. (For example, the EU negotiates trade deals, not member states.) However, member states often opt out of directives that all states must adhere to, such as the euro for Sweden. The conflict between European and national sovereignty evokes a sclerotic government that cannot assert universal policy and is unaccountable to the people. The unelected Commission takes the lead in legislation, and weaker countries such as Greece suffer EU directives without their consent while stronger ones can form coalitions against ideas they dislike, as the rich northern states have done to counter large European spending projects with the so-called league of the “frugal four.” 

Thus, states should create a confederation to maintain economic ties while also preserving national sovereignty. Heads of state and government would join together in an assembly or congress to decide new proposals, and the Commission can remain, albeit in an advisory capacity. The sole voting power would be in the congress of heads of state and government. The resulting compromise makes governments directly accountable to the people since they serve as their representatives in the congress while avoiding the thorny issue of European sovereignty. Since the EU would not be sovereign, there are no universal directives to be applied to everyone; meaning countries would be on a more or less equal footing in the assembly. If Germany does not partake in a specific resolution voted by the assembly, the directive would not be binding on it; but a smaller country like Greece would also reserve such a power. No more troika sacrifices. 

A confederation would thereby ensure national sovereignty while also preserving the benefits of economic integration. The single market could remain, but states should abandon economic plans with political goals such as the euro, despite their praiseworthy ambitions; countries could negotiate trade deals independently. Individual states would retain control over immigration, economic planning, climate policy, and the legislation and execution of laws; however, they may still band together to negotiate resolutions or directives on these issues, which would then become binding. Voting would be done by unanimous consensus; any country could opt out of a directive since sovereignty would be in the hands of the states, not the EU. The EU would thereby provide a place for yearly government assemblies to decide common issues while leaving the member states to do as they please when it comes to their individual problems. 

With the creation of a confederation, Europe’s governance will be less bureaucratic, more focused, and, ultimately, more responsive to citizens’ needs by preserving their national sovereignty. Asserting European sovereignty in a continent with such different political and economic views is an almost impossible task. Though the recent EU budget negotiations showed some promise—they managed to build a new budget while addressing some criticisms on corruption—the major dilemmas of the European Union, namely the question of sovereignty, remain unresolved. In its present state, the EU resembles a hodgepodge of lofty ambitions and unfinished projects with ambiguous scope; one need only glance at the overlap between the Eurozone, Schengen, and the EU’s borders to perceive the lack of a uniform, standard policy. Consequently, commendable policies such as Emmanuel Macron’s European defense fund, proposed in November of 2018, tend to drown in the crowd of directives instead of finding themselves into law. 

What the EU needs is a change of focus, not of the heart. Its goal of maintaining peace and prosperity for Europe is as admirable as ever; it just needs the proper institutional framework, a confederation, to make it work.