To say that since 1979 relations between the United States and Iran have been troublesome is a gross understatement. The two nations have a lot of excess baggage between them, and relations today have not improved. Currently the two countries seem geared towards war. How did we get here? How can we stop the conflict? And should we?

History provides some insight into contemporary Iran-US relations. At the start of the 20th century, between 1905 and 1911, Iran underwent a revolution resulting in the establishment of a constitutional monarchy: the imperial family, the Qajars, were to share power with a parliament known as the Majlis. This revolution, though condemned by Russia and the UK—who subsequently bombed the Majlis and reinstated authoritarian rule in Iran—was supported by the United States. Surprisingly, the first finance minister of the new constitutional monarchy was American. Iran and the United States have not always had tensions—and a return to such times is possible.

Yet while the United States did not interfere in Iran in the early 20th century, it did not show such restraint in 1953. In the early 1950s Mohammad Mossadegh, Iran’s democratically elected prime minister, nationalized all of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s assets in Iran, effectively nationalizing Iran’s oil sector and creating the National Iranian Oil Company. Mossadegh believed the UK had no right to Iran’s oil and that Iran’s monarch, Shah Reza Mohammad Pahlavi, had no prerogative to hand over large portions of it to the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The UK, outraged by Mossadegh’s actions, took the Iranian government to the UN’s International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ, however, ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the case, which allowed Iran to maintain control of its oil. Following the debacle, the UK waged a trade war with Iran and sought America’s help to overthrow Mossadegh’s democratically elected government, with the 1953 CIA coup d’état against Mossadegh being the end result.

Thanks to the CIA coup, the Shah’s status was elevated from co-leader—with the other leader being the prime minister—to autocrat. Between 1953 and Iran’s second revolution, in 1979, he retained his position of dictator. There are mixed views regarding these twenty years. The Shah modernized the country’s judicial system along Western lines, though arrests without trial were prevalent toward the end of his reign. Economically the period was prosperous, with Iran’s GDP increasing and the oil sector booming because of the Shah and foreign companies’ investments. But while the economy as a whole improved, rapid industrialization exacerbated regional and social inequalities. Tehran increasingly resembled a modern, Western city, but rural parts of the country were left behind. Corruption was rife as Iran experienced a period of economic growth similar to that of America’s gilded age. The Shah, his entourage, and the growing middle class profited, yet the poor’s condition remained the same and, in some cases, worsened.

Political liberties were also ambiguous. In 1963, during his White Revolution, the Shah granted Iranian women the right to vote. But elections were rigged—never was the pro-Mossadegh National Front a winner, despite its massive popularity at the polls. Additionally, the Shah cracked down regularly on liberals, communists, and religious leaders—anybody suspected to be against the monarchy. He established the Savak—Gestapo-like secret police—to enforce his will. Anyone suspected of “treason” was sentenced—often without trial—to the infamous Evin prison in Tehran. So many anti-Shah intellectuals were held in Evin that the prison was nicknamed “Evin University.”

Iran’s 1979 revolution was not so much a religious reaction against the Shah’s reforms as it was objections against a corrupt government and unjust economy. While the Shah organized massive ceremonies—such as his celebration of 2500 years of Persian Empire, held in Persepolis, the ancient capital of the Achaemenid Empire—levels of education (e.g. literacy rates) and wages among the poor failed to increase. Iran’s economy still lacked the dynamism of the West’s, as it still relied heavily on oil to boost GDP. Political liberty was a joke, and the Shah himself lacked acumen when dealing with his allies: although the US was an Iranian ally when a Republican was in office, Democrats, such as Jimmy Carter, somewhat resented him. (The latter even stood by Khomeini, Iran’s religious future leader, in the months leading up to the revolution.) The Shah did improve women’s rights, reformed the judicial system, and introduced massive industrialization, but it was too little. His corruption, blatant ignorance of political rights and ostentatious behavior only deepened resentment for him.

How does this history inform on dealing with Iran today? The 1979 revolution was also a backlash against Western intervention in Iran. Memories of the 1909 bombing of the Majlis, 1921 coup, 1941 invasion of Iran and the 1953 coup—all supported by Western powers, primarily the UK—were still ingrained in the minds of Iranians. Both sides of the revolution, pro and anti-Shah, claimed Western powers were helping the other side. (Khomeini, one of the revolutionary leaders, called the Shah an “American puppet” while the opposition deemed him a British one.) Iranians, though globally friendly toward the West, especially the United States, will not want to recall such times where their country was manipulated by foreign entities. And since it is vital to have the backing of Iranian citizens when fighting the Iranian government, it is primordial for the West not to appear domineering towards Iran’s people. What does this entail? Let me explain.

First, the United States should abandon sanctions on Iran. Iran’s citizens are not at fault with the regime’s presence in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, and therefore should not be punished. Sanctions only reinforce the dictatorship’s rhetoric: their claim that the United States does not care for Iranians and is untrustworthy becomes credible in the eyes of the populace. They boost the appeal of Iranian hardliners and fundamentalists in parliament in a time where moderate Iranian rulers are desperately needed to avoid war.

Second, Europe should maintain its efforts in reinstating the Nuclear Deal. Iran has started to renege on some of its promises—namely enriching uranium above the permitted levels—but European leaders must understand that such antics are bargaining tools, and do not prove that Iran has stopped committing to the deal. Furthermore, they should realize that moderates and hardliners split Iran’s political climate. This means aggressive actions, such as bombing oil tankers going through the Strait of Hormuz, were not undertaken by Rouhani’s moderate government but by radicals, such as Iran’s Revolutionary Guard.

Third, the West must avoid war at all costs: if there is war, all chance of ridding Iran of its tyrannical theocracy is gone as Iranians—liberals and religious conservatives alike—unite against invading powers. Instead, the West must regain its credibility by removing sanctions and showing Iranians that liberalism and democracy work: they’re not Western ploys for defeating Iran. Luckily, Iran has an expansive, educated middle class that understands such distinctions. But war strangles its efforts at best and turns Iran’s liberals into zealots at worst.

Iran and the West have a long, tumultuous relationship. It has persevered through revolutions and coups. It has proven resilient enough to withstand the worst calamities. It even blossomed for a time. But a war today inevitably ends it.